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ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
A reading of the principal briefs filed for both parties shows 
that the issues are adequately framed. Appellant will not 
duplicate the arguments made in his original brief but will, in the 
interest of time, make a summary response to the points raised by 
the appellee. 
B. The Judgment Should Be Set Aside for Excusable Neglect 
Hatch argues in his brief that the summary judgments entered 
should remain in place because there is evidence that Rogan 
neglected to protect his interests. This argument begs the 
question at issue under Rule 60(b) of whether the neglect was 
excusable. 
Rogan fully acknowledges that the judgments were entered 
because certain procedural steps were not taken to protect his 
interest. There is no factual issue about what he did or did not 
do procedurally. The issue presented is whether, under the law, 
failure to act was excusable. The very nature of a Rule 60(b) (1) 
motion is that the party making the motion will always be subject 
to the accusation that he failed to act in a particular way thus 
leading to a judgment. The argument made by Hatch avoids a 
discussion of the applicable standard of review for the 
circumstances by just stating a conclusion. 
As Rogan points out in his principal brief, motions to set 
aside judgments may be granted where there is a showing of good 
faith, the default resulted from a genuine mistake, and there is a 
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showing of a potentially meritorious defense. May v. Thompson, 677 
P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984); Erickson v. Schenkers International 
Forwarders. Inc. . 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994) . Rogan has shown that 
he meets this standard by taking affirmative steps to protect 
himself and then suffered judgments on the pending motions because 
he relied erroneously on the representations of a court clerk. An 
examination of the record described in Rogan!s primary brief shows 
that there was always forward movement on his part to address the 
problem once he became aware there was a problem. 
C. Judgment on the Counterclaim Should be Set Aside 
Again, Rogan does not here repeat in detail the arguments he 
makes in his principal brief. The responsive brief by appellee 
Hatch discusses both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. A 
reading of the argument made thereunder shows that Hatch fails to 
create a substantive argument in opposition. 
The discussion by Hatch of personal jurisdiction is without 
legal effect here. Rogan does not challenge the personal 
jurisdiction of the circuit court over him. As Hatch himself 
points out, subject matter jurisdiction is a separate consideration 
from personal jurisdiction. A trial court must have both personal 
and subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Bickford, 672 P.2d 607 
(Kan. 1983). Failure to have complete jurisdiction deprives the 
court of the authority to enter an order. Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 
1178 (Utah 1991); Matter of Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679 
(Utah App. 1988). 
Hatch cites no legal authority contrary to Rogan!s argument 
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that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
the counterclaim exceeded $20,000. Instead, Hatch constructs an 
argument that because the circuit court had personal jurisdiction 
and because it had jurisdiction up to $20,000, somehow the court 
could enter a summary judgment on the counterclaim in the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. The argument is illogical and ignores the 
fundamental principles that jurisdiction of the court is limited to 
that granted by constitution or statute. Matter of Estate of 
McLaughlin, Id. 
The lack of subject matter (claims over $20,000) jurisdiction 
remains unrefuted. At a minimum, the judgment on the counterclaim 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Rogan has shown that this court should find the trial court 
abused its discretion in sustaining the summary judgment on the 
principal claim. Rogan has shown that he thought he had legal 
counsel and, when he discovered he did not, he appeared at the 
court, made an arrangement with the court clerk, and immediately 
hired current counsel when he learned that judgments were entered 
contrary to the representations of the court clerk. With public 
policy disfavoring resolutions of claims by default, the trial 
court should have set aside the summary judgment and allowed Rogan 
to respond. 
Rogan has also shown without any contrary authority cited by 
the appellee that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to 
enter summary judgment on the counterclaim. Consequently, this 
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court should find that even if the neglect by Rogan was not 
excusable it was error to not set aside the summary judgment for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
This court is respectfully requested to set aside the 
judgments entered and find there was no jurisdiction in the circuit 
court. 
DATED this /s day of June, 1995. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY 4^/^k^DERS, ESQ. 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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